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Strategic Insights: Cyber (In)Security, the
Americas, and U.S. National Security
September 12, 2016 | Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz

According to the Organization of American States (OAS) in its report on “Latin American
and Caribbean Cyber Security Trends” released in June 2014, Latin America and the
Caribbean have the fastest growing Internet population in the world with 147 million
users in 2013 and growing each year.1 While having more users and more network
connections are great advancements for traditional developing nations, they also
represent a potential threat. Audrey Kurth Cronin points out that “insurgents and
terrorist groups have effectively used the Internet to support their operations for at least a
decade. The tools of the global information age have helped them with administrative
tasks, coordination of operations, recruitment of potential members, and
communications among adherents.”2 While much of the discussion regarding potential
enemy attacks on U.S. cyber critical infrastructure mainly focuses on China,3 Russia,4 and
Iran,5 the Americas have been largely ignored in the literature. Why are the Americas
important? Why should we be discussing its place within the U.S. national security
strategic goals?
The Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Strategy (2015) recognizes the nefarious
effects cyber criminals pose to the welfare of nation-states. According to the DoD’s Cyber
Strategy (2015), “criminal actors pose a considerable threat in cyberspace, particularly to
financial institutions, and ideological groups often use hackers to further their political
objectives. State and non-state threats often also bend together, patriotic entities often act
as cyber surrogates for states, and non-state entities can provide cover for state-based
operators.”6 As the nations of Latin America join the globalized and interconnected world
of the 21st century, they must do everything within their power to ensure that their
sovereign territory does not become a safe haven for cyber criminals. As Nathaniel

Bowler, a reporter with the Global News Matters Caribbean Research, has explained: “the
failure to respond [to cybercrime], not just at a local but a regional level, is precisely what
is turning the Caribbean/Latin American region into a hive for cyber criminality.”7
Jane Fraser, CEO of Citigroup Latin America, also states that over half the population
in Latin America and the Caribbean is online, and that the rate of growth in Internet use
is among the highest in the world.8 Particularly troubling regarding cybersecurity in the
Americas is the fact that as more people join the information superhighway, the Americas
still lack any cybersecurity strategies or critical infrastructure plans. Again, as Fraser
points out, “cybercrime in Latin America and the Caribbean is estimated to be close to
$90 billion a year. Yet 80 percent of the countries in the region do not have cybersecurity
strategies or critical infrastructure plans. Sixty-six percent do not have the resources or
expertise.”9 Cybercrime in the Americas not only undermines the democratic progress
achieved thus far, but it could also harm economic growth. Jane Fraser notes that
“combating cybercrime and strengthening cyber resilience are imperative to economic
and social development and should be considered a critical cornerstone of domestic and
foreign policy.”10
In the traditional view of political realism, the nation-state is the primary unit of
analysis and a sovereign hegemon. However, in the cyberworld of the 21st century, the
Internet is seen as the realization of the classic international relations theory of an
anarchic, leaderless world.11 The cyberworld of the 21st century could be argued as the
equivalent of a Hobbesian state of nature. Given that most countries in the Americas do
not have cybersecurity strategies or critical infrastructure plans, the Americas could be
used by terrorist organizations and transnational organized crime cartels to launch an
attack on U.S. critical infrastructure. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army
General Martin E. Dempsey, stated that “the spread of digital technology has not been
without consequences. It has also introduced new dangers to our security and our
safety.”12
In the new wars of the 21st century, the use of cyberpower in conjunction with kinetic
military power will be a force multiplier. The Internet has become an essential component
of terrorists' information operations (IOs) designed to achieve offensive strategic
objectives, as future conflicts in the 21st century extend from the physical domain into
cyberspace. In his “International Strategy for Cyberspace,” President Obama
acknowledged that “cybersecurity threats can even endanger international peace and
security more broadly, as traditional forms of conflict are extended into cyberspace.”13 In
secret and without fear of retaliation, Jihadist groups and terrorist organizations are
using the Internet as a tool to conduct cyberplanning—“the digital coordination of an
integrated plan stretching across geographical boundaries that may or may not result in

bloodshed.”14 Within the realm of Latin America and the Caribbean, as the Internet
becomes an integral part of the globalized international system, the two “monster
countries” Brazil and Mexico cannot be ignored.

Map 1. Brazil and its Neighbors.
In his book Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy, the late
George F. Kennan explains that a “monster country” is a country endowed with an
enormous territory and population.15 The characterization of Brazil as a “monster
country” places Brazil in the same category of nations such as China, Britain, the United
States, and Japan. A monster country is endowed with the following characteristics:
continental territorial dimensions and a population of more than 150 million people, a
tradition of economic development, and a diverse foreign trade policy. Brazil, the sleeping
giant of South America, occupies half of the continent and is the fifth most populous
country in the world with an estimated population of about 205 million people. Eightyfour percent of the Brazilian population is heavily concentrated in urban centers,
especially São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Approximately 22 million Brazilians were
victims of cybercrimes in 2012, and that number continues to grow. This large number of
cyber-victimization occurs despite advanced capabilities in cybersecurity and deterring
cybercrime, with numerous state institutions and agencies playing active roles. Even with
these attempts of combating traditional crimes and cybercrime within the state, Brazil
still expresses concern with criminalizing cyber offenses. The lack of a cohesive
corresponding legal framework that would address these various offenses inhibits the
prosecution of those who commit recognized cybercrimes. Another major concern
regarding Brazil is its geographical proximity to the Tri-Border Area (TBA).

Map 2. The Tri-Border Region in Latin America is composed of the cities of
Ciudad del Este, Alto Paraná; Puerto Iguazú, Misiones; and Foz do Iguaçu,
Paraná.
According to Peter J. Meyer, there are no “known operational cells of [al-Qaeda] or
Hezbollah related groups in the Western Hemisphere; however, the United States
remains concerned that proceeds from legal and illegal goods flowing through the TBA
could potentially be diverted to support terrorist groups.” 16 For example, in December
2010, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Hezbollah’s chief representative in South
America, Bilal Mohsen Wehbe, for transferring funds collected in Brazil to a Hezbollah
group in Lebanon.17 The ability of potential enemies of the United States to operate
without impunity within the TBA could result in an attack against the U.S. homeland’s
critical infrastructure. This is particularly troubling since, despite known activities by
potential enemies, the Brazilian government has yet to adopt legislation to make
terrorism financing an autonomous offense.18 Max G. Manwaring, the former General
Douglas MacArthur Chair and emeritus professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army
War College, argues that “gangs are half-political and half-criminal nonstate actors that
actually and potentially pose a dominant, complex emergency threat in a security
environment in which failing states flourish.”19
Mexico is the second “monster country” in the Americas which, due to its ongoing gang
related violence and drug trafficking, represents another major concern for U.S. national
security in the Internet age. Mexico has an estimated population of approximately 122
million people, with 76 percent of its population living in urban centers, mainly Mexico
City.

Map 3. Central Intelligence Agency, Fact Book. Available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-worldfactbook/geos/mx.html.
The rising levels of hacktivism throughout the world are staggering, and Mexico has
been ranked “as one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to cyberattacks.”20 It saw an
estimated 40 percent21 increase and a staggering 113 percent increase in the number of
cybercrime incidents in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Cartels, a longitme concern for the
Mexican government, have embraced the Internet to recruit new members, complete
transactions, and search for newer and more targets to exploit.22
Likewise, the proliferation and anonymity of the Internet fosters hacktivist recruitment
for groups such as Anonymous and improves their ability to escape prosecution.
Combined with perceived declines in social and economic conditions, hacktivism is likely
to increase. Specifically, situations such as the retaliatory kidnapping of a hacker with the
group Anonymous, who threatened the Los Zetas cartel and their cohorts with
cybertactics, will be more likely. Prioritization of cyberthreats has yet to rise like the other
national security concerns that result from the environment along the U.S.-Mexico
border, such as that of traditional cartel violence and corruption among Mexican law
enforcement officials.23
In the U.S., the DoD designated cyberspace as a new domain of warfare in 2011. This
elevation in strategic importance makes cyberspace comparable to land, sea, air, or outer
space as a new battle frontier. The U.S. government and its armed forces recognize
cyberspace as a potential future battleground. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
has publicly stated that “cyberspace is the new frontier, full of possibilities to advance
security and prosperity in the 21st century. And yet, with these possibilities, also come
new perils and new dangers.”24 Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army
General Martin E. Dempsey stated that “the Department of Defense is adding a new
mission: defending the nation, when asked, from attacks of significant consequence—
those that threaten life, limb, and the country’s core critical infrastructure.”25 For
international jihadists, the Internet has become without a shadow of a doubt the most
cost-effective means of delivering its messages worldwide, coordinating attacks and, most
importantly, allowing jihadist organizations to recruit without leaving the confines of

their safe havens. Jihadist groups and terrorist organizations are using the Internet as a
tool to carry out their “cyberplanning” in secret and without fear of retaliation. Lieutenant
Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, an analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office in Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, defines “cyberplanning” as “the digital coordination of an
integrated plan stretching across geographic boundaries that may or may not result in
bloodshed.”26
Cyberwar in the “hacked world order”27 of the 21st century is much like Carl von
Clausewitz’s view of war as “a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the
given cases.”28 Given the problem of attribution and the ability of hackers or organized
criminal organizations to route their attacks, Henry Kissinger argues in his book World
Order, that “cyberspace challenges all historical experiences. . . . The threats emerging
from cyberspace are nebulous and undefined and may be difficult to attribute.”29 The
Internet is becoming an integral part of the globalized international system, part of the
“new wars . . . in which the difference between internal and external is blurred; they are
both global and local and they are different both from classic inter-state wars and classic
civil wars.”30 In the globalized world of the 21st century, nation-states and violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) alike will make use of the power of technology to advance their
activities without fear of retaliation, prosecution, or concern from geographical
boundaries.31
In Latin America, governments have become extremely concerned about the
proliferation of the Internet as a force multiplier in the commission of a crime. For
example, governments in Latin America are concerned with the “criminal practices of
individuals and crime networks connected to cyberspace with the intention of making
illicit economic gains. Common examples range from e-banking scams to drug trafficking
and child pornography.”32 The prevalence of drug trafficking increases in relation to “the
[Internet emerging] as a critical interface in the selling and purchasing of all manner of
commodities, including both prescription and illicit narcotics . . . drug profits are often
laundered through the Internet through the purchasing of goods and services and the
transferring of cash.”33 In the new brave world of the 21st century, a “new criminality” is
emerging in cyberspace. The world of “the Internet and related social media tools have
not just empowered citizens to exercise their rights, but also enabled and extended the
reach of gangs, cartels, and organized criminals.”34
Given the Hobbesian nature of cyberspace, what can the United States Government
and its Army do to assist the nations of Latin America in their struggle against hacktivism
and cybercriminals and therefore prevent a potential enemy from attacking U.S. critical
infrastructure? First, the U.S. Department of Defense and its cybersecurity organizations
(U.S. Cyber Command, Army Cyber Command, Navy Cyber Forces, and Air Forces

Cyber/24th Air Force) must do everything within their power to stop or at least mitigate
the consequences of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against the homeland’s
critical infrastructure.
Second, the U.S. Government should shore up international support for the Budapest
Convention on Cybercrime and other multilateral cybersecurity arrangements including,
but not limited to: the International Telecommunications Union’s World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS) and the Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA), the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the European Network and Information Security Agency
(ENISA), the Computer Emergency Response Pre-Configuration Team (CERT-EU), and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russia Council. This is an important step
that should be taken by the U.S. Government and its cybersecurity agencies since the
digital world routinely ignores national and international boundaries.
Third, the U.S. Government should provide the developing world with technical and
foreign aid assistance tied to the development of cyber investigation methods, cyber
training, cyber policing, and law enforcement cooperation and assistance. The U.S. should
assist the developing world as it joins cyberspace as a latecomer. Perhaps the U.S.
Government should create a Cyber Marshall Plan for the developing world similar to the
Marshall Plan created for Europe in the aftermath of World War II; when critical
infrastructures were destroyed, the Marshall Plan helped in the reconstruction of Europe.
The U.S. Government cannot afford to allow the developing world to become a conduit for
cyberattacks against the homeland’s critical infrastructure.
Fourth, the U.S. Government must continue to invest in its cyber workforce despite
balanced budget disputes and sequestration. As Frank J. Cilluffo, Director of the George
Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, and Sharon L. Cardash,
Associate Director at the Homeland Security Policy Institute, have stated: “there is no
substitute for a human source (HUMINT). Collecting and exploiting all-sources of
intelligence is therefore the most robust way forward, even in the cyber realm.”35
Finally, the U.S. Government and its federal agencies must engage the private sector in
a conversation regarding their shared responsibility and accountability for the exchange
of information about cyberthreats and cyberterrorism via the Internet. Former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Martin E. Dempsey publicly acknowledged that
“sharing information about cyberthreats is one of the most important ways to strengthen
cybersecurity across the private sector, but threat information primarily is shared in only
one direction: from the government to critical infrastructure operators.”36
In his book, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of
Globalization, John Robb argues that “we have entered the age of the faceless, agile
enemy. From London to Madrid to Nigeria to Russia, stateless terrorist groups have

emerged to score blow after blow against us.”37 Therefore, to ignore the Western
Hemisphere could result in damaging consequences to the national security of the U.S.,
its allies, and national critical infrastructure. As Martin Van Creveld in his seminal book,
The Transformation of War: the most radical reinterpretation of armed conflict since
Clausewitz, points out: “in the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups
whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly
hit on more formal titles to describe themselves.”38
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